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An Ever-Shadowed Past? Citizens’ Attitudes towards the 
Dictatorship in Twenty-First Century Portugal
José Santana-Pereira, Filipa Raimundo and António Costa Pinto
There is a growing stream of literature investigating the persistence of authoritarian values in 
democratic and quasi-democratic countries, among both citizens and elites (Stevens, Bishin 
& Barr 2006; Pietsch, Miller & Karp 2015). Yet little attention has been paid to the issue of how 
citizens and elites in democratic countries evaluate the authoritarian past in which part of 
the population has been socialised. We argue that understanding how citizens feel about the 
political regime that preceded their democracy may contribute to a better understanding 
of voters’ preferences and voting behaviour. It may also bring into evidence the existence 
of dormant issues, i.e., issues that may not appear to be salient but which may resurge at 
any point. In addition, it may allow us to extract some conclusions about the authoritarian 
regime itself, particularly its socialisation and indoctrination capacity.
This article explores citizens’ attitudes towards the authoritarian past in a country that 
was ruled by a right-wing fascist-type dictatorship for almost fifty years: Portugal. We take 
advantage of the fact that, forty years after the breakdown of the dictatorship, there is still a 
sizable cohort of individuals who were at least 21 years old in 1974 and who lived and were 
socialised under the previous regime.
Portugal was the first country of the third wave of democratisation to initiate its transition 
to democracy, but its authoritarian regime was one of the longest in twentieth-century 
Europe, lasting from 1926 to 1974. Salazar’s regime outlived all other inter-war dictatorships 
(with the exception of Francoism), surviving well beyond the post-war period. After 1945, the 
regime forcefully held on to its African territories while facing increasingly strong international 
pressures to decolonise. Between 1961 and 1974, a large segment of the population was 
affected by a three-stage colonial war in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique.1 And 
ABSTRACT
Several years after the transition to democracy, positive attitudes 
towards the authoritarian past are still observable in Portugal: the 
belief that the previous regime had more good things than bad 
things is expressed by about one-fifth  of the Portuguese. What 
explains this nostalgic sentiment? Are factors such as socialisation 
under the regime, party identification or religiosity more important 
than satisfaction with democracy and the state of the economy? The 
empirical analysis suggests that the relevance of these factors varies 
considerably, but socialisation phases lead to different stances on the 
past both in routine times and in times of economic crisis.
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2  J. SAnTAnA-PEREIRA ET Al.
on 25 April 1974, partly in reaction to the never-ending wars against the independent 
movements in those countries, a group of middle-rank military staged a coup that brought 
down the authoritarian regime in an abrupt yet non-violent manner – the so-called ‘Carnation 
Revolution’ – followed by a comprehensive transitional justice process (Pinto and Raimundo 
2014). In six years, Portuguese democracy was fully consolidated and in 1986 the country 
became a full European Economic Community member-state.
Today, forty years after the beginning of the transition to democracy, some positive 
attitudes towards the authoritarian past still persist. In the past 15 years, both the Research 
Centre of Public Opinion at the Portuguese Catholic University (CESOP/UCP) and the Quality 
of Democracy Barometer of the Institute of Social Sciences, University of lisbon (BQD/ICS) 
have carried out surveys on the occasion of the 30th and 40th anniversaries of the Carnation 
Revolution.
According to the data produced by these surveys, there is still a surprising number of 
Portuguese citizens who believe the authoritarian regime had more positive than negative 
aspects: 19 per cent in 2004 and 21 per cent in 2014. If we add to these figures the individuals 
who evaluate the previous regime as having had as many good things as bad things, the 
percentages increase to 47 and 53 per cent in 2004 and 2014, respectively (Figure 1). This 
means not only that one in every five citizens believes that the Estado novo (new State, 
the Portuguese authoritarian regime) had more positive than negative features, but also 
that there is a cleavage between those who consider the regime to have been relatively 
negative and those who see it as a neutral or relatively positive experience. Also, it seems 
that neutral and positive assessments of the political past increased slightly between 2004 
and 2014. Thirty and forty years after the revolution, and in the context of an absence of 
political discourse about the past (Raimundo 2012), these findings are striking.
The goal of this article is to identify the factors underlying the assessment of Salazar and 
Caetano’s dictatorship, decades after the democratic consolidation in Portugal, in light of 
the existing literature. We examine those societal attitudes by focusing particularly on the 
positive attitudes expressed by a minor but sizable share of the population, distinguishing 
between two socialisation phases of different length under the authoritarian regime: first, 
the years from institutionalisation to the beginning of the colonial wars, and second, from 
the beginning of the colonial wars until the military coup of 1974.
The first phase of the Portuguese regime (1932–60) can in fact be divided in two. From 1932 
to 1944, the Portuguese dictatorship was strongly associated with European fascism. In its early 
years, the regime openly expressed its authoritarian values, backed by a propaganda apparatus, 
youth paramilitary organisations, militias and strong political repression. In addition, the regime 
implemented a policy of ‘Christianising’ institutions and the school system in close association 
with the Catholic Church, through a common corporatist, anti-liberal and anti-communist 
ideological and political nucleus. After 1945, with the end of the Second World War, a new period 
began in which the dictatorship had difficulties in adapting to the new international scene. This 
led to changes that increased the regime’s limited pluralism. In this period, the Church gradually 
became an ideological haven, and the vitality of the Catholic organisations increased. Traditional 
Catholicism and the Church were, on the one hand, the dictatorship’s most powerful weapons; 
on the other hand, they limited ‘fascistisation’, becoming the driving force of the new State’s 
limited pluralism (Pinto 2011). Since we do not expect these two phases to have considerably 
different outcomes in terms of socialisation, we do not separate the two periods in the empirical 
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The second phase (1961–74) was characterised by modernisation, political turmoil, the 
impact of the colonial wars in Africa, a certain degree of international criticism of the regime, 
and the replacement of Salazar by Caetano (in 1968). This phase may have had a greater 
impact in people’s lives than the previous one, given the war effort. In fact, the proportion 
of the Portuguese population under arms in Africa (140,000 men) was only exceeded by 
Israel and north and South Vietnam.
The article is organised as follows. The next section explores the existing studies on 
attitudes towards authoritarianism and authoritarian pasts and examines the results of 
previous studies on Portuguese attitudes towards the new State. The following section 
presents the data, the hypotheses and the statistical results, showing that, contrary to what 
we might expect, the factors that explain the attitudes towards the past in 2004 fail to do so 
in 2014. The article ends with some tentative conclusions regarding the attitudes towards 
the past in Portugal and suggests avenues for future research.
Attitudes towards the past in post-communist and post-authoritarian 
democracies
Public opinion studies conducted in post-authoritarian democracies usually focus on 
democratic attitudes and authoritarian values and only occasionally on attitudes towards 
the authoritarian past itself (Stevens, Bishin & Barr 2006; Chu et al. 2008; Mattes 2012; 
Figure 1. attitudes towards the authoritarian past in Spain, chile and portugal (per cent of respondents 
in each category; valid percentages).
notes: in portugal 2004 and 2014, the first and the second possible answers were slightly different from those included 
in the Spanish and the chilean questionnaires: instead of ‘negative’, ‘more bad things than good things’; and instead of 
‘positive’; ‘more good things than bad things’. these were, respectively, the most negative and the most positive categories 
in the scale used by the portuguese surveys, which makes its comparison with the ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ categories in the 











































4  J. SAnTAnA-PEREIRA ET Al.
Pietsch, Miller & Karp 2015). This is probably a consequence of the reduced number of survey 
questions measuring citizens’ feelings about the regime they or their relatives have been 
socialised in. To our knowledge, there is but a handful of countries where data on societal 
attitudes towards the authoritarian past have been collected on a regular basis, hence there 
are few individual, let alone comparative, studies on attitudes towards the past.
In 1972, Samuel Barnes wrote a pioneer study on political attitudes in post-fascist 
Italy. Using data extracted from a 1968 public opinion study, the author evaluated the 
extent to which Italian fascism had been able to indoctrinate its citizens and the impact 
of socialisation under fascist institutions. Barnes assumed that ‘if the age cohorts that 
reached maturity during the fascist era were indeed effectively socialised by the regime, 
some residues should remain in their political attitudes and behaviour that set them 
apart from those socialised before and after’ (Barnes 1972, p. 46). he concluded that 
there were very few traces of fascist ideology in the cohorts that had been socialised 
under Mussolini’s regime, which did not come as a surprise, given the medium level of 
institutionalisation of the fascist regime and its inability to overcome powerful traditional 
institutions such as the Catholic Church.
The Four nation Survey, implemented almost twenty years later in Portugal, Spain, Italy 
and Greece, showed that 15 per cent of Portuguese respondents considered that, overall, 
Salazar’s regime was good for the country (against 19 per cent of Spaniards assessing Franco’s 
regime in the same way). Interestingly enough, in the four countries, around 50 per cent of 
citizens assessed the regimes of Salazar, Franco, Mussolini and the Colonels as having been 
partially good and partially bad for their respective countries (Sani et al. 1985). Positive 
attitudes towards the previous regime were at the time higher in Portugal and Spain than 
in Italy and Greece. Although the authors suggest that this may be linked to the duration of 
the Iberian dictatorships and therefore be expressed by the older generations, no statistical 
analysis has been provided to support this claim.
In 1998, Morlino and Mattei interpreted the share of positive attitudes towards the 
previous regime as a sign of potential support for authoritarianism. When they looked at 
the 1985 data their conclusion was that ‘room exists for a new authoritarianism at least 
in Italy and Portugal’ (Morlino & Mattei 1998, p. 1,756). Today we know that there is not 
necessarily a link between authoritarian values and support for democracy, something that 
was acknowledged by Morlino and Montero in 1995.
We argue that exploring the determinants of attitudes towards the past, and particularly 
nostalgia – broadly understood as the persistence of positive attitudes towards the past 
– is both relevant and necessary, in the context of both transitional societies and fully 
consolidated democracies, as it can shed light on the elite’s or citizens’ political preferences 
and patterns of socialisation.
The region where the legacies of the past have been more thoroughly analysed is 
post-communist Europe. Studies focusing on post-communist countries are probably 
the richest where respondents have been asked to make a retrospective evaluation of 
the old regime. These studies have essentially made use of the new Europe Barometer 
data, which includes three relevant questions: ‘Where on this scale would you put the 
former Communist regime?’, ‘With which of the following do you most closely identify 
with?’ and ‘Should we return to Communist rule?’ Some of these questions are used 
precisely to measure the percentage of citizens who are nostalgic for the old regime, 
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First, Ekman and linde (2005, p. 26) argue that nostalgia is related to age: ‘the older the 
respondents, the more likely they are to express feelings of nostalgia’. More recently, Pop-
Eleches and Tucker (2014) have taken a different approach to age, looking predominantly at 
the effects of exposure to different types of communism. Their conclusion is that the longer 
the period of exposure to communism, the higher the levels of opposition to democracy. 
Second, Ekman and linde (2005) argue that nostalgia is not so much the expression of non-
democratic values as a negative evaluation of the present situation. looking at the same 
cases, Gherghina and Klymenko (2012) reach a different conclusion. They argue that nostalgia 
is driven not so much by an evaluation of present and recent experiences and rather by 
retrospective evaluations and memories of the past, where socialisation appears to play a 
crucial role. lastly, studies on post-communist nostalgia have predominantly explored the 
relationship between nostalgia among the (economic) winners and losers of the transition. 
These studies have found that nostalgia is most prevalent among coal miners and private 
farmers and less so among office employees and skilled workers (Kurczewski 1994).
Among (right-wing) post-authoritarian countries where data on attitudes towards the past 
has been collected on more than one occasion, the case of Spain is particularly interesting for 
our study. After Portugal, Spain had the second-longest dictatorship in Europe. Yet differently 
from what happened in Portugal, the Francoist regime emerged out of a brutal civil war and 
came to an end through a process of ruptura pactada initiated with Franco’s death in 1975. 
A survey conducted in 1978 by the FOESSA (Fomento de Estudios Sociales y de Sociologia 
Aplicada – Promotion of Social Studies and Applied Sociology) Foundation has shown 
that – following a period of uncertainty regarding the transition and the ability of the new 
democratic elite to maintain peace in the country – more than 75 per cent of respondents 
agreed that the Francoist regime was characterised by social inequality, repression and lack 
of freedom, but an equally high 68 per cent believed that under Franco Spain had developed 
economically and that ‘nearly all Spaniards lived better although some benefited more than 
others’ (Aguilar Fernández 2009, p. 461). According to Aguilar Fernández, ‘there was still 
significant backing for a benevolent assessment of the dictatorship, based mainly on what 
has since been called “performance-based legitimacy”’ (Aguilar Fernández 2009, p. 461). The 
Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS – Centre for Sociological Research) also collected 
data on attitudes towards the Francoist regime on more than one occasion.3 Their data seem 
to confirm the interpretation by Montero and Torcal according to which after the 1980s the 
historical evaluation of the Francoist period became less straightforward. In other words, 
even though the percentage of negative evaluations tends to increase, a majority of the 
respondents seems to have opted for an ambivalent position (Montero & Torcal 1990, p. 55; 
see also Gunther, Montero & Botella 2004).
In Chile, where there was also a negotiated transition to democracy, similar questions have 
been posed on a number of occasions. Yet, unlike in Spain, the Chilean dictator, Pinochet, 
was not only alive but also strongly present in the country after the transition to democracy, 
first as commander-in-chief of the Chilean Army and later as senator for life.4 huneeus (2003) 
shows that individuals who place themselves on the right tend to say that the Pinochet years 
were positive and those who place themselves on the left evaluate the regime negatively. 
There is also a strong relationship between voting for a particular party and the evaluation 
of the regime. Interestingly, the author identifies a group of nostalgic individuals whom he 
describes as those who ‘admit the existence of democracy, without fighting against it, but 
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In Portugal, a study carried out in 1978 by Bacalhau and Bruneau showed that about 
35 per cent of the interviewees depicted Caetano’s and Salazar’s rule as better than the 
governments formed after April 1974, while more than 40 per cent did not know or refused 
to reply.5 This means that in 1978 the authoritarian rulers were relatively more popular than 
the prime ministers in the first years of the transition (Bacalhau & Bruneau 1978; see Freire 
et al. 2005). In addition, Caetano – Salazar’s replacement after the dictator became severely ill 
in 1968 – tends to perform better than Salazar in terms of government assessment. In 1984, 
the situation is similar: despite the fact that now only about 21 per cent of the interviewees 
say they don’t know or refuse to answer, those who preferred the government of Salazar 
and Caetano still outnumber those who believe that the best government was one of the 
cabinets formed after 1974; again, amongst the dictators, Caetano is preferred to Salazar 
(Bruneau & Bacalhau 1984; see Freire et al. 2005).
The studies carried out in Spain and Chile allow us to compare Portugal with fairly similar 
situations. Figure 1 compares data for the three countries in three different years, and allows 
us to identify different patterns: Spain, where the levels of public debate about the past are 
relatively high (Aguilar Fernández 2008) and most people tend to look at Franco’s regime 
as not particularly good or bad; Chile, where the politicisation of the past is very strong, the 
majority of the population has neutral attitudes towards the authoritarian regime, but the 
proportion of people who assess positively the authoritarian rule is higher than in Spain 
(though declining); and lastly, Portugal, a country in which the past is hardly an issue in the 
political sphere (Raimundo 2012), whose general panorama in 1985 was similar to that of 
Spain and is nowadays characterised by higher proportions of citizens evaluating Salazar’s 
regime as mainly negative or mainly positive.
Despite the scarcity of theory on the correlates of attitudes towards the past, the present 
article explores some of the existing studies, building on their main conclusions. The studies 
focusing on the factors underlying the attitudes towards the past have identified the role 
played by dimensions such as party identification (in Chile, where the issue is politically 
relevant; huneeus 2003), assessments of the current situation (Ekman & linde 2005) and 
socialisation (Gherghina & Klymenko 2012). These explanatory factors are tested in the 
following section, in which a model of attitudes towards the authoritarian regime in Portugal 
will be empirically tested.
Attitudes towards the past in Portugal, 2004 and 2014
Goals, hypotheses, data
The goal of the present article is to identify the factors underlying the assessment of the 
Salazar and Caetano’s dictatorship, several decades after the transition to democracy. In 
a context where democracy has been the only game in town for a long time, there is a 
surprisingly large number of citizens who believe that the authoritarian regime had more 
positive than negative aspects: 19 per cent in 2004 and 21 per cent in 2014.
Based on the literature on nostalgia towards the non-democratic past focused on other 
countries, we derived several hypotheses about the factors that may impact on attitudes 
towards the authoritarian regime in Portugal. We organise our hypotheses in three groups: 
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The first two hypotheses concern socialisation, one of the main bases for attitudes towards 
the past in post-communist countries (Gherghina & Klymenko 2012). Following Pop-Eleches 
and Tucker (2014), we are interested in analysing the differential impact of exposure to 
different phases of the authoritarian regime in Portugal. First, we expect people who were 
fully socialised in the first period of the authoritarian regime (i.e. before the start of the 
Portuguese colonial wars in Africa) to be more positive towards the regime, due to the 
strong indoctrination effect of schooling and other socialisation agents in that era. In other 
words, we expect these attitudes to be more positive for those who were born between 
1927 and 1940, and therefore lived their impressionable years (Krosnick & Alwin 1989) 
entirely in this context. Second, we expect the respondents who were fully socialised after 
the Carnation Revolution, i.e., those who were born in or after 1968, to be more negative in 
their evaluations of the previous regime than the others, since the general environment in 
which their socialisation took place should have led to the adoption of values that are not 
congruent with a positive assessment of a dictatorial regime. In methodological terms, the 
creation of two dummy variables (one distinguishing the first group, composed of the older 
respondents, and the second distinguishing the younger cohorts) causes the middle-age 
cohorts (those born between 1941 and 1967, who were either socialised in different contexts 
or fully socialised in the last, less stable, phase of the new State), who are expected to hold 
milder attitudes vis-à-vis the former groups, to function as a reference category.
H1:  Citizens who were socialised during the first period of the authoritarian regime (1932–61) 
will display more positive attitudes towards this regime.
H2:  Citizens who were socialised during democracy will present more negative attitudes towards 
the authoritarian regime.
The following two hypotheses deal with the impact of party attachments on attitudes 
towards the political past. These hypotheses are partly drawn from the results of research on 
Chile (huneeus 2003), but also from previous research on elite attitudes towards the past in 
Portugal (e.g. Raimundo 2012). The Portuguese left is characterised by parties associated with 
the antifascist struggle and the opposition to the previous regime: the centre-left Partido 
Socialista (PS – Socialist Party), the communist/green stable coalition Coligação Democrática 
Unitária (CDU – Unitary Democratic Coalition) and the Bloco de Esquerda (BE – left Bloc). 
Therefore we can expect citizens who feel close to those parties to express more negative 
attitudes towards the past. On the centre-right, existing research shows that the main party, 
Partido Social Democrata (PSD – Social Democratic Party), has an ambivalent position, and its 
preferred option has been to remain silent and express neutral views of the past (Raimundo 
2015). On the right, the CDS-PP (Partido Popular – Popular Party) has been the most active in 
bringing issues that relate to the past on to the agenda. In particular, during recent years, the 
CDS-PP has made the issues of decolonisation and the acknowledgement and compensation 
of the combatants one of its flags. For that reason, we should expect citizens who identify 
themselves with CDS-PP to express less negative views of the past. While we know that the 
patterns of party polarisation around this issue are much lower than in Chile, we expect that 
party identification will nevertheless play a role.
H3:  Citizens who feel close to right-wing parties (namely CDS-PP) are more likely to display 
positive assessments of the authoritarian regime.
H4:  Citizens who are close to left-wing parties such as PS, BE or CDU will have more negative 
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The last set of hypotheses deal with assessments of the status quo in the country, which 
have been identified as factors in attitudes towards the non-democratic past by previous 
research (Ekman & linde 2005). In this study, we are interested in the impact of satisfaction 
with the way democracy functions, and the personal financial situation of the respondents. 
Due to lack of data on economic conditions and perceptions of the interviewees, the latter 
is operationalised through data on work situation, namely by means of a dummy variable 
distinguishing the unemployed from the other respondents.
H5:  low levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works are associated with positive 
assessments of Salazar’s regime.
H6:  Unemployed citizens will be more likely to assess the authoritarian regime positively than 
others.
This article rests on survey data collected in 2004 by the Public Opinion Study Centre 
of the Portuguese Catholic University and in 2014 by the Quality of Democracy Barometer 
of the Institute of Social Sciences, University of lisbon. These two years were not selected 
randomly: in fact, both surveys were carried out right before the celebration of the 30th and 
the 40th anniversaries of the Carnation Revolution that paved the way for the establishment 
of a democratic regime in Portugal. In 2004, 1,216 citizens were interviewed, while in 2014 
the sample was composed of 1,256 respondents. The independent (socialisation phases, 
party identification, assessment of the status quo), dependent (attitudes towards the new 
State) and control variables (gender, education and religiosity) tested in the next subsection 
are described in Table 1.
Table 1. Variables used in the regression models.
Variable Question used (our translation) Final scale
Dependent
assessment of the authoritarian 
regime
according to your experience or 
what you heard, how do you think 
that the political regime that existed 
before 25 april 1974 should be 
portrayed?
three-point scale: 1 = as a period 
with more bad things than good 
things, 2 = as a period with as many 
good things as bad things, 3 = as a 
period with more good things than 
bad things
Independent
Socialisation in the first period of the 
new State
how old are you? 1 = citizens born in or after 1927 
who completed 21 years of age in or 
before 1961
Socialisation in democracy how old are you? 1 = citizens born in or after 1968
party identification do you feel close to any political 
party? if yes, which one?
Several dummies: BE, cdu, cdp-pp, 
pS, pSd
Satisfaction with democracy in general, are you very satisfied, 
reasonably satisfied, not very 
satisfied or not satisfied at all with 
the way democracy works?
Four-point scale: 1 (not satisfied at all) 
to 4 (very satisfied)
Work status What is your current work situation? 1 = respondent is unemployed
Control
Gender registered by interviewer 1 = female
religiosity do you consider yourself to be 
very, reasonably, somewhat or not 
religious at all?
Four-point scale: 1 (not religious at 
all) to 4 (very religious)
Education What was the highest educational 
level that you completed?
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Results
In the next paragraphs, the results of two ordinal logistic regression models using the 
variables mentioned above as factors of the assessment of Salazar’s regime6 in 2004 and 
2014 are presented and discussed.
The first two columns in Table 2 display the results for 2004. We start by stressing that 
two out of the three control variables, namely education and religiosity, are relevant 
factors of attitudes towards the past. Indeed, the more educated the respondents are, 
the less likely they are to assess the new State in a positive fashion. The poorly educated 
have a 76 per cent probability of assessing the previous regime as negative and an 11 
per cent probability of assessing it positively. On the contrary, people who attended 
university are only five per cent likely to express positive attitudes and 87 per cent 
likely to be negative towards the past. Also, the more religious the respondents report 
themselves to be, the less likely they are to display a negative appraisal of Salazar’s 
regime. When the other factors are kept constant at their mean values, strongly religious 
respondents have a 78 per cent probability of displaying negative judgements and a 
ten per cent probability of expressing positive attitudes towards the past. In turn, those 
who are not religious are 85 per cent likely to be negative and only six per cent likely to 
be positive towards the new State.
Regarding the personal experience variables, socialisation under the first period of 
authoritarian rule (that is, before 1961) has a significant impact. This means that only 
hypothesis 1 is empirically supported: when we keep the other factors constant at their 
Table 2.  determinants of the assessment of the Estado novo in 2004 and 2014: ordinal logistic 
regressions.
Source: cESop Survey on the 30th anniversary of the carnation revolution; Quality of democracy Barometer Survey on the 
40th anniversary of the carnation revolution.
notes: in the first column, values are unstandardized coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. in the second 
column, values are the changes in the probability of holding different attitudes caused by shifting from the minimum 
to the maximum value of the independent variable, when all the other variables are held at their mean. Multicollinearity 








threshold = 1 −0.34(0.33) 0.22(0.31)
threshold = 2 1.08**(0.33) 1.67***(0.31)
Gender (Female) −0.18(0.13) 0.02 −0.04(0.12) 0.01
Education −0.15**(0.05) 0.07 0.04(0.05) 0.01
religiosity 0.17*(0.08) 0.05 0.11(0.07) 0.02
Socialisation in first phase of 
new State
0.50**(0.18) 0.06 −0.43(0.25) 0.04
Socialisation in democracy −0.03(0.15) 0.01 −0.27*(0.13) 0.06
cdu −0.80*(0.34) 0.07 −0.13(0.27) 0.02
pS −0.57**(0.17) 0.05 0.13(0.16) 0.02
pSd 0.13(0.17) 0.01 0.28(0.19) 0.04
cdS-pp 0.48(0.43) 0.03 0.28(0.59) 0.04
BE −1.19*(0.50) 0.08 −0.19(0.37) 0.03
Satisfaction with democracy −0.14(0.08) 0.06 −0.01(0.08) 0.01
Work status (unemployed) −0.07(0.24) 0.01 0.32*(0.16) 0.05
N 1,006 1,098
pseudo R2 (nagelkerke) 8.2% 1.9%
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means, the probability of assessing the new State positively is 12 per cent for those who 
were socialised in that period and only seven per cent for people born between 1941 and 
1967 (the baseline category). The latter group – composed of those who were socialised 
during the second phase of the regime – have a 82 per cent probability of holding negative 
attitudes towards the authoritarian regime, while the older group is only 74 per cent likely 
to express such judgements. Unlike our expectations, the assessment of Salazar’s regime 
made by those socialised under a democratic regime is not statistically different from the 
judgement expressed by the intermediate socialisation group. In short, socialisation seems 
to matter, but the cutting point is around 1961, the beginning of the new State’s second, 
more turbulent, phase.
Party attachments are also relevant factors of attitudes towards the past. In fact, all but 
two of the party identification dummies are statistically significant. Identification with left-
wing parties (CDU, BE, PS) raises the probability of assessing the new State negatively from 
around 79/80 per cent to around 87 (PS) or 93 per cent (BE). In the same vein, the likelihood 
of being positive towards the authoritarian regime is about eight per cent for those who 
do not feel close to these parties and considerably lower (between three and five per cent) 
for those who identify with them. hypothesis 4 is therefore supported by this empirical 
evidence. Interestingly, identification with right-wing parties (PSD and CDS-PP) has no 
significant impact. While these results are generally in line with our expectations, the fact 
that identification with the most right-wing party with parliamentary representation in the 
Portuguese political system (CDS-PP) is not at all connected with attitudes towards the 
previous right-wing authoritarian regime is striking.
Also surprising is the fact that, in 2004, evaluations of the way democracy works do not 
have an impact in the assessment of the past regime, nor does the financial situation of the 
respondents (measured through a proxy, i.e. whether they are unemployed). Unlike what 
happens in other contexts (Ekman & linde 2005), it would seem that the Portuguese citizens 
did not express attitudes towards the past in a strategic way, as a means of criticising or 
supporting the current state of things in the country.
In sum, the specific time of socialisation and party attachments (especially identification 
with left-wing parties) are the most significant factors behind the attitudes towards the 
authoritarian regime in Portugal, 30  years after the Carnation Revolution. Interestingly 
enough, these attitudes are not linked to partisan attachment to the main centre-right party 
in Portugal (PSD) – which constitutes evidence of a poor politicisation of the past by this 
party vis-à-vis other parties in the Portuguese political spectrum (Raimundo 2015) – or to 
the right-wing party CDS-PP, which, however, has tried to put some issues relating to the 
past on the political agenda (Raimundo 2012). The average discrete changes7 show that 
there is a considerable degree of balance in the impact of these factors, even if identification 
with the new left BE or the communist/green coalition CDU seems to explain more variance 
in the attitudes held by the Portuguese than does socialisation or identification with the 
centre-left PS.
let us now have a look at the data for 2014 (Table 2). There are considerable differences 
between the results discussed above and those estimated for this year. First, education 
and religiosity are no longer relevant. Second, socialisation is still relevant, but now the 
differences are between those who were socialised under the democratic regime and 
the others. The former have less positive attitudes towards the previous regime than the 
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When the other variables are held constant, the likelihood of holding negative attitudes 
towards the previous regime is 69 per cent for those who were not socialised under the 
dictatorship and 63 per cent for the others. In the same vein, the probability of assessing 
the new State positively is 18 per cent for the older and 14 per cent for the younger group.
In 2004, it was not this dichotomy that made the difference in terms of attitudes towards 
the past, but the cleavage between those who were fully socialised before 1961 and those 
who were not. The differences vis-à-vis 2004 may be partly explained by the entry of a 
new generation in the younger group (those born between 1986 and 1999, who were not 
interviewed in 2004 and whose attitudes towards the past are fairly negative – 1.7 on a three-
point scale) and the exit of a generation in the older group: those who were born before 
1930 (6.5 per cent of the sample in 2004 but only one per cent of the sample in 2014), who 
were more positive about the new State (average assessment of 2 on a three-point scale). 
In 2014, these events stressed the cleavage between those who were fully socialised after 
1974 and the intermediate socialisation group and nuanced the differences amongst those 
who were fully socialised before 1961 and that same reference group.
Unlike our expectations, the impact of relatively stable political attitudes such as party 
identification is not statistically significant (Table 2). Aside from socialisation under the 
democratic regime, the only relevant factor is work status, those who were not working 
at the time of the interview being more likely to assess the previous regime positively. The 
unemployed are 20 per cent likely to be positive towards the new State and 60 per cent 
likely to disapprove of it, while those whose job situation is different are only 15 per cent 
likely to favour the previous regime but 67 per cent likely to reprove it.
Conclusions
In this article we tested a model aimed at explaining the variance in the attitudes 
towards the past amongst Portuguese citizens at two different points in time: 2004 and 
2014. The results allow us to conclude that the factors underlying these attitudes are 
unstable, having varied considerably in one decade. In terms of the socialisation factors, 
while in 2004 it seemed that what mattered was having been socialised before 1961, in 
2014 the key factor was having been socialised after the Carnation Revolution (1974). 
Our expectations about the impact of partisan attachments are empirically supported 
in 2004, but not in 2014, which suggests that the authoritarian past as an issue was 
depoliticised between 2004 and 2014. Meanwhile, the impact of short-term variables 
such as being unemployed is observable only in 2014.
let us take a closer look at the patterns observed. In 2004, an array of variables of 
different nature (the specific period of socialisation, party attachments, but also religiosity 
and education) had an impact on the expression of positive or negative attitudes 
towards the new State. In short, socialisation before 1961 and religiosity foster positive 
assessments of the previous regime, while education and closeness to left-wing parties 
such as PS, CDU or BE lead to more negative assessments of Salazar’s rule. As expected, 
attitudes towards the past are not linked to identification with the centre-right PSD, 
due to the low levels of politicisation of the past by this party in the years that followed 
the Carnation Revolution (Raimundo 2015). The same holds true for identification with 
the right-wing CDS-PP, which has, however, a different record in terms of its relationship 
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In 2014, the patterns observed ten years before are no longer present. Only socialisation 
under democratic rule and work status explain the variation in attitudes towards the past. 
Although modest, the impact of the variable ‘work status’ on attitudes towards the past allows 
us to hypothesise that, in a situation of economic and financial crisis (with the related negative 
impact in terms of trust in political institutions) it is not stable political predispositions 
but short-term assessments of the current situation that influence people’s evaluation of 
the dictatorship that was in place until 1974. In other words, displaying positive attitudes 
towards the previous regime may be a form of protest against the crisis, the government, 
the traditional political parties, the austerity measures and the national and international 
political institutions believed to be behind the current turmoil. While the 2014 survey did 
not collect data on these factors that would allow us to test this hypothesis, the impact of 
work status seems to point in that direction. Future research should focus on the test of this 
sort of protest nostalgia that we are hypothesising.
A second avenue of research on attitudes towards the past in Portugal has to do with the 
relationship between the new State and the colonial empire in Africa and Asia. A few recent 
studies in history and anthropology have pointed out the existence of a certain nostalgia for 
the empire in Portuguese society, visible in discourses on national identity (Jerónimo & Pinto 
2015; leal 2009). Added value for our understanding of the determinants of attitudes towards 
the past, particularly the differences between left and right, would come from collecting data 
on attitudes towards the colonies and decolonisation among Portuguese citizens. This would 
also increase our ability to compare the Portuguese case with other European democracies, 
particularly post-colonial countries such as France, the UK and the netherlands.
Notes
1.  Although the Portuguese empire included territories in India, the Indian annexation of Goa 
in December 1961 put an end to the Portuguese presence in the region in less than two days.
2.  In 2009, the Flash Eurobarometer (EB) on the 2004 Enlargement asked citizens in all member 
states whether they thought that ‘the situation which prevailed in Central and Eastern European 
countries before 1989 was better than today’s’ (Flash EB 257).
3.  The question was, ‘looking back, how do you think Franco’s regime will be regarded in the 
future: as a positive period for Spain; as a negative period for Spain; or as a period that had 
good things and bad things’? (‘Con la perspectiva que dan los años, ?cómo cree Vd. Que pasará 
a la historia el régimen de Franco: como un período positivo para España, como um período 
negativo para España o como una etapa que tuvo cosas buenas y cosas malas?’) (CIS 1995, 2000).
4.  Surveys conducted during that period as well as after Pinochet’s arrest included questions 
such as: ‘In your opinion, regarding General Augusto Pinochet’s regime, do you think …’ (‘En 
su opinión, mirando el régimen del general Augusto Pinochet, piensa que …’); ‘What is your 
opinion about the 17 years of General Pinochet’s government? Would you say they were …?’ 
(‘Cuál es su opinión sobre los 17 años del gobierno del general Pinochet? Diría Ud que fueron 
…’ (huneeus 2003).
5.  The question was, ‘Which government or regime was better at ruling the country?’
6.  In this section, when we mention the dependent variable in this study, the expressions ‘attitudes 
towards the past’, ‘attitudes towards the new State’ and ‘attitudes towards Salazar’s regime’ are 
used interchangeably, in order to avoid repetition.
7.  The average discrete changes scores are an average of the changes in the probability of 
holding different attitudes caused by shifting from the minimum to the maximum value of 
the independent variable, when all the other variables are held at their means. These scores 
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